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The research conducted in this report seeks to uncover the effects diversity in corporate board 
of directors have on the illegal sales of weapons to countries experiencing U.N arms 
embargoes. From our analysis and for the companies we investigated, we can determine that 
gender diversity in a company's board of directors does not influence a company's propensity 
to engage in illegal arms trading. This is evident from linear regression and various fixed effect 
regressions performed in our analysis. We postulate that the factors contributing to these 
actions are more complex than attributing them to one sole factor alone and each company’s 
internal and external dynamics will determine how large of a role gender diversity will have 
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motivation behind this thesis was to investigate the relationship that gender diversity in a 
company’s board of directors had on their propensity to engage in illegal arms trade. By better 
understanding the factors that influence this behaviour, the UN can create better informed 
policies to protect the citizens of countries in armed conflicts.  
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1 Introduction 
In many ways violence and conflict have transformed over the past 100 years. Wars once 
involving nations from around the world have largely ceased and in their stead have been 
replaced by civil wars, extremist attacks, and coups. It is also important to note that these 
violent conflicts disproportionately effect developing nations. For example, eight out of ten of 
the world's poorest countries are suffering, or have recently suffered, from large scale violent 
conflict (Stewart, 2002). As of 1970 in an effort to reduce these conflicts, the United Nations 
began imposing arms embargoes, which seek to prevent the sale of weapons to sanctioned 
countries (United Nations, 2011). This has been used as a substitute to more general trade 
embargoes that create lasting negative effects for the victims of these hostilities. 
However, companies are willing to risk punitive repercussions of illegal arms trading due to 
the substantial financial compensation available for providing arms to groups in embargoed 
countries. It is estimated that the black market for small arms trafficking generates in excess 
of 1 billion dollars a year globally (Stohl, 2005). By doing so they contribute to making the 
policy and sanctions imposed by the UN ineffective in deescalating warfare. In order to fulfil 
the objective of these embargoes it is important to be able to identify the companies engaging 
in these practices and prevent them from continuing in the future. This begs the question; how 
can we identify companies engaging in illegal arms trading? By answering this question, we 
can create more informed policy and prevent these activities from transpiring, however data 
on illicit activities is not readily available to the public. With this in mind we need to consider 
factors and attributes of weapons companies that may influence them to engage in these 
behaviors. Of specific interests to our research efforts is how gender diversity of corporate 
board of directors influences the illegal arms trade. 
Since the end of World War II, changes in societal norms and policy transformations have 
resulted in substantial improvements in the fight for gender-equality. This has led to an 
increase in women’s participation in the workforce that has almost reached parity with that of 
their male counterparts in Canada (Morissette, 2018). At the same time there has been a similar 
gender convergence in women’s criminal activity, though to a lesser extent (Campaniello, 
2019). However, even with the increase in female crime over the past few decades there is still 
very little data and research associated with this field of study. This is especially true with 
regards to white-collar crime. At present we see the number of women in upper-level 
management positions at peak levels and they are only expected to rise (Catalyst, 2020). With 
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this is mind it is critical to consider if gender diversity in corporate structures has a positive or 
negative effect on the organizations’ propensity to engage in illegal activity.  
In recent years, the female representation in large global arms-producing and military service 
companies has been on an upward trajectory. As of 2019, CEO’s of four of the five largest 
U.S defense contractors: Northrop Grumman, Lockheed Martin, General Dynamics and 
defense arm of Boeing - were women (Brown & Hellman, 2019). At present, many 
humanitarian groups and government agencies are concerned about the supply of weapons to 
countries that are subject to U.N arms embargoes in an effort to quell hostilities. In the past 
these sanctions have been seemingly effective, however companies have been engaging in 
illegal arms trading. Is it possible that increased female presence on these boards will reduce 
the occurrences of these criminal offences? Or conversely, could more female board members 
result in more nefarious outcomes? 
Aim of the Thesis  
This research paper seeks to identify companies engaging in illegal arms trading between 2009 
and 2020 and the effects that gender diversity in their board structure plays in their propensity 
to engage in these activities. Our thesis is based on the identification strategy in Della Vinga 
and La Ferrara (2007) and focuses on events that occurred in 11 countries of interest that 
experienced U.N arms embargoes between 2009 and 2020. The events investigated can be 
characterized as increasing or decreasing hostilities. If the event has 50 or more casualties it 
is considered as increasing hostilities, if the event mentions peace talks or agreements it is 
considered to be decreasing hostilities and if neither of these criteria are met the event is 
considered as neutral. We obtain data on corporate board diversity for the top 100 arms 
manufactures according to Stockholm International Peace Research Institute companies and 
supplemented by small arms companies corresponding to the SIC codes 3482-3484. Then by 
accessing publicly available financial data for the aforementioned companies through the 
Refinitiv database, it is possible to analyze returns data that coincides with events increasing 
or decreasing hostilities in countries under U.N arms embargoes. Suspiciously high abnormal 
returns associated with events of interest resulted in the company being flagged. To avoid 
instances where abnormal returns occurred as a result of external factors, we analyze further 
only companies with at least three flagged events. The companies and their corresponding 
gender diversity percentages could then be examined by linear regression to see if gender is a 
significant factor in determining a company's propensity to engage in illegal arms trading. 
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Other follow up analysis was performed to investigate how gender diversity of corporate board 
of directors for weapons companies would affect their engagement in illegal arms dealing.   
Structure of Thesis 
For the convenience of the reader, we have outlined the remainder of the thesis as follows. 
Chapter 2 is a literature review, presenting Della Vinga and La Ferrara (2007) and is the basis 
for our research. Chapter 3 discusses the methodology. Next, in Chapter 4 the results obtained 
from our analysis are discussed along with their implications. Finally, in chapter 5 we conclude 
our findings and look toward next steps for this body of research. 
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2 Literature Review 
The research conducted in this report seeks to uncover the effects diversity in corporate board 
of directors have on the illegal sale of weapons to countries experiencing U.N arms embargoes. 
The foundation of this research is based on the identification and strategy in Della Vigna and 
La Ferrara (2007). The initial questions they were trying to answer focused on which countries 
were the sales of illicit weapon sales originating from and what companies were involved. The 
research is based on the belief that well-informed investors have knowledge about companies 
engaging in illegal arms trades and will thus invest in these companies. These investments can 
then be observed as abnormal returns in publicly available financial data. The researchers also 
choose to investigate the effects of the corruption and how it impacts illegal arms trading based 
on where the companies are headquartered. Based on where companies are headquartered, 
they can face differing punitive and reputational costs for violating an embargo. Therefore, it 
stands to reason companies in high-corruption and low-cost of violation countries are more 
likely to engage in illegal arms trading.  
The results of the analysis revealed that companies were profiting from engaging in the illegal 
sale of arms and that companies in higher corruption countries were more likely to violate the 
arms embargoes. We contribute by looking for illegal arms trading between 2009 and 2020, 
in the period after the sample of Della Vigna and La Ferrara between 1995 and 2005. A similar 
detection strategy is used in Guidolin and La Ferrara (2007) and Dube et al. (2011). The 
authors find that by using publicly available financial data surrounding events of interest, they 
are able to determine the effects these events have on investors and the societal, political and 
economic conditions they find most favourable. None of these articles look at board 
composition, however Dube et al. (2011) used a similar detection strategy. In their paper they 
look at abnormal returns around events, in this case coup authorizations or actual coup events, 
for detecting the financial impact on multinational companies that stood to benefit from U.S 
backed coups. Similarly, our team used stock price data centered around events increasing 
hostilities in U.N embargoed countries to determine if the companies were engaging in illegal 
arms trading. Our detection strategy differs from Dube et al. (2011) because we choose to use 




This section will describe the research question, the techniques used for its exploration, and 
the data collection and manipulation involved in the process. Section 3.1 focuses on the data 
collection and data exploration of returns, event, and board data. Section 3.2 introduces the 
research question and the motives behind its exploration. Section 3.3 outlines the techniques 
and approaches used to examine the research question.  
3.1 Data 
To address the question of diversity and its effects on company engagements in illegal activity 
we use events data from The Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED) at a 
country level, Returns data from DataStream at a company level, and company information 
available on DataStream. The combination of company returns data and events data is all 
inclusive, meaning regardless of company’s headquarters on DataStream they are paired with 
events of interest determined later in the study. The company specific information is joined 
based on company name.  
Event data collected from ACLED is obtained using the platforms built in dashboard 
configuration (ACLED, 2021). The events selected were in the date range of January 1st, 
2009 – April 1, 2020. The region-specific criterion selected events from the following 
regions: Afghanistan, Iran, Iraq, Liberia, Libya Malawi, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Somalia, 
South Sudan, Sudan, Syria, Belarus, Central African Republic, Democratic Republic of 
Congo, Egypt, Eritrea, Guinea, Ivory Coast, Lebanon, Uzbekistan, Venezuela, Yemen, 
Zimbabwe. The types of events selected include battles, strategic developments, and riots. 
ACLED allows for more refined selections within each of these 4 event types but for this 
analysis all subcategories were selected. Lastly, upon the initial pull of the data all levels of 
fatality counts were selected and are refined during the analysis to only consist of violent 
events having 50 or more fatalities. Table 1 shows the data extracted from ACLED 
consisted of a total of 534 unique events across all the regions of interest. Of these 534 













To ensure that events have a low probability of falling within another events event-window 
the events within Table 1 that met the above criteria are also subject to a date separation 
criterion that requires days between events to be greater than or equal to 15 days. To account 
for events occurring on weekends (non-trading days), all events occurring on Saturdays or 
Sundays are pushed to the next trading day (Monday). Upon elimination of event crossover, 
the 534 events from ACLED are condensed to 70 events, 67 of which are hostile. Table 2 
shows the yearly distribution of events from before and after the elimination of crossover 
events and the distribution of these 70 events across countries of origin are seen in Figure 1. 








Figure 1: Events of interest per country per year to be used in event study analysis with returns data from 
companies of interest. 
 
The complete event list of the 70 events of interest can be found in the Appendix, containing 
information about the country, date of occurrence and description of the event.  
The returns data that was used in this study was accessed through Refinitiv’s database. 
Companies of interest were selected by their appearance on the Stockholm International Peace 
Research Institute top 100 arms-producing and military service companies 2019. They were 
chosen because they constitute the largest arms dealing companies in the world and are 
publicly traded companies which means they have available financial data. Another important 
consideration was trying to select companies headquartered in a variety of different countries 
to account for different societal, economic, and political conditions. The companies could be 
queried, and the historic daily closing stock price information was obtained. The return data 
gathered from Refinitiv has a total of 73 companies with data from January 1st, 2009 – 
December 31st, 2020. Using the adjusted closing prices of each company, company specific 








Where 𝑅𝑖,𝑡 is the returns of company i at time t, and c is the closing price of company i at time 
t. Company specific returns are used to determine potentially illegal actions regarding 
violations of arms embargos. The Returns values for each company are joined with each of 
the 70 chosen events given the event takes place within the available return data range. The 
returns-event data amalgamation is used to generate all the necessary examination windows 
needed for event studies. Of the 73 companies from the arms industries of interest for this 
study 11 do not have significant financial stock data available on DataStream for complete 
coverage of event date range. On average most companies display 3,000 observations of stock 
closing price for the study period of 2009-2020. 
Based on the same criterion used for selected companies returns data, board information was 
also obtained for the available companies. This information due to the need for company 
disclosure is much sparser than the other data used in this study. The data pulled from Refinitiv 
included a variety of environmental, social, governance, and company controversy 
information. For the following analysis only information pertaining to board gender diversity 
was incorporated. Each company had their own year range where information regarding the 
target variables was reported. However, in general the all-inclusive year range for the entire 
board data set ranges from 2009-2020. Many companies in the dataset had begun reporting 
gender diversity information between 2009-2020 when the data became available or when 
women became board members for the first time. Out of the 73 companies that possess returns 
data only 64 have listings of board diversity demographics. Of these 64 companies in the year 
span of 2009-2020, 26% of the observations are missing. Most of the missing observations 
occur in 2009 & 2020 as seen in Table 3. 





3.2 Research Question 
The target for this research is to examine the following relationship: 
Does the gender diversity of cooperate board structures affect a company's propensity to 
engage in illegal activities? 
This thesis is designed to examine and answer this research question in two stages: 
determining companies suspected of illegal smuggling and subsequently examining the impact 
of female diversity on illegal activity. The determination of companies suspected of illegal 
trading is done with two important social and economic indicators: Events and return data. 
(McWilliams & Siegel, 1999). The second stage involves using these company indicators of 
illegal activity to examine the relationship between their presence and the board diversity. 
3.3 Empirical Strategy 
To investigate the relationship between board diversity and engagement in illegal events a few 
regression analyses were conducted focusing on the response variable being the binary time 
and company specific illegal event flag and the explanatory variable being the board diversity. 
The process is broken down into three separate regression methods, standard OLS, fixed 
effects and distributed lag models seen in Equation (1), (2), and (3) respectively. 
𝐼𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑑𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 
𝐼𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛽1𝑑𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜇𝑖 + 𝜃𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 
𝐼𝑖,𝑡 = ∑ 𝛽𝑗𝑑𝑖,𝑡
𝑗




Where 𝐼𝑖,𝑡 is the binary descriptor for illegal events, zero in absence of an event and one in the 
presence of an illegal flag. 𝑑𝑖,𝑡 is the board diversity for company i at time t, and 𝑑𝑖,𝑡
𝑗
 is the 
board diversity for company i at time t and lag -3 ≤ j ≥ 3. With 𝜇𝑖 and 𝜃𝑡 representing the 






Sections 3.3.1 Financial Event Studies 
To determine the suspected presence of illegal activity, an event study using the events data 
and company financial data is conducted. A financial event study, using the standard 
methodology for the market model is used for company specific abnormal returns for illegal 
activity detection. Previous research shows that this method is effective in the detection of 
illegal event chains (DellaVigna & Ferrara, 2007). The market model, abnormal returns and 
cumulative abnormal returns used in our market model event study are shown in Equations 
(4), (5) and (6) respectively (Zhou & Cui, 2019). 
𝐸(𝑅)𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽𝑅𝑚,𝑡 + 𝜇𝑖,𝑡 





Where 𝐸(𝑅)𝑖,𝑡 is the expected returns for company i at time t, 𝑅𝑚,𝑡 denotes the return of the 
comprehensive index m of the stock market where the listed company i was listed on the tth 
day, 𝛼𝑖 and 𝛽 are the intercept and slope of the market model. 𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝑡 is the abnormal returns 
for company i at time t, and are determined by the difference between company i observed 
returns at time t denoted by 𝑅𝑅𝑖,𝑡 and their expected returns at time t determined by equation 
(4). Cumulative abnormal returns for company i during time interval T[1,3] is the summation 
of abnormal returns over time interval T. Massimo Guidolin and Eliana La Ferrara used this 
methodology that was first presented by John Y. Campbell, Andrew W. Lo, and Craig A. 
Mackinlay to discover the relationship between cease conflict in Angola and the decrease in 
abnormal returns around “Angolan” Company portfolios (Guidolin & Ferrara, 2004;  
Campbell & Lo, 1997). 
Due to a high degree of academic support of this approach as well as the robustness checks 
done on all levels of the analysis this method was used for the selection of suspected 
companies. For every company and every event, a pre-event and event-window are defined. 
Dube et al used a prevent window with of two years, three years prior to the event of interest 
taking place to estimate the firm-specific abnormal returns (Dube & Kaplan, 2011).  However, 
for our analysis a pre-event window of 90-trading days centered around 90 trading days prior 





chosen. This specification was made to create a balance between event overlap and capturing 
current company financial stock standing accurately. The market model in Equation (4) is 
used in conjunction with the pre-event window to train a regression model used to predict 
expected returns over the 20-day event window. The abnormal returns over this event window 
is determined with Equation (5) and the subsequent cumulative abnormal returns with 
Equation (6). Lastly, a regression examines the relationship between the cumulative abnormal 
returns and a three-day event window to determine the presence of a suspected illegal 
instances. Companies that display a 5% significance level around the event date are flagged 
for that event. 
Two important explanations behind the above analysis are warranted to enhance and select 
companies suspected of illegal activities that will later be used in the diversity studies. The 
first being the effects of hostile events on a company’s business and financial standings. For 
arms dealing companies, the presence of conflict is always a double-edged sword. On one 
hand conflict increases the demand for weapons and therefore increases and arms companies 
overall financial standpoint. But on the other hand, an increase in conflict either moves 
countries to be put under arms embargos or extends a current arms embargo which would 
decrease the ability to sell arms and therefore decrease financial standing. With this in mind 
and the assumption of insider trading that are stated in the research concluded by DellaVigna 
& Ferrara a hostile event is good for a company who is engaging in illegal trading and therefore 
will see a spike in returns around these events. Versus a company not engaging in illegal 
trading will experience little to no fluctuation around them due to the absence of insider trading 
and financial gain of the company.  
The second important notion behind listing a company as being suspected of illegal activity is 
the importance of illegal event chains vs just illegal events. Illegal event chains are the 
summation of all suspected illegal events for company i in country c. The importance of using 
illegal event chains over illegal events is that it reduces the probability of false positives 
created in the event study. In the event of a company being flagged for an illegal event, they 
are assigned a tag for that event. If a company reached or exceed three tags, meaning they have 
been flagged for 3 separate events within a given country they are selected as a company 
suspected of illegal activity. These companies are then assigned illegal activity indicators for 
all the years that the events indicating illegal activity occurred in. If a company is flagged, all 
years that they do not have illegal event flags from the event study are set to 0. For companies 
where event chains are less than three, all years or set to 0. 
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The event study procedure was then conducted on the 67 events over the 73 companies of 
interest from 2009-2020. Yielding 36 event chains that are greater than or equal to three. 
Within these findings there are three companies who have event chains greater than three in 
multiple countries including: Amphenol Corp., Kratos Defense Solutions, and Leidos. 
Appendix C depicts all company-country interactions and their corresponding event chains, 
companies with event chains greater than or equal to three will be formally suspected embargo 
violating companies in the board analysis study. Figure 2 depicts the mean 3-day abnormal 
returns for company-country pairings that are suspected and not suspected of illegal activities 
for events that increase conflict, decrease conflict and on days where no event occurred. The 
figure demonstrates the relationship discussed in DellaVigna & Ferrara research around events 
that increase or decrease conflict and their corresponding influence on 3-day abnormal returns.  
Figure 2: Average 3-day abnormal returns for around events increasing conflict, decreasing conflict and 
no events for both companies suspected of illegal activities and those not suspected with 95% confidence 
intervals. 
 
For company-country pairing that were flagged for illegal activity through the financial event 
study it is evident that they show higher abnormal returns than companies-country pairings 
not flagged. Demonstrating that events that increase conflict are resulting in higher-than-
expected stock prices for these flagged companies suspected of not maintaining arms embargo 
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sanctions. Whereas companies not suspected are showing a decrease in financial standing due 
to the increase in conflict and inability to sell arms. 
Section 3.3.2 Distributed-lag models  
When examining the relationship of interest, it is reasonable to use a fixed effects model with 
binned endpoints. A standardized time and company unit fixed effects regression to estimate 
the presence of illegal activity given by 𝐼𝑖,𝑡 is shown in Equation (7) (Schmidheiny & 
Seigloch, 2020): 
𝐼𝑖,𝑡 = ∑ 𝛽𝑗𝑏𝑖,𝑡
𝑗














             𝑖𝑓 𝑗 = 𝑗




                  𝑖𝑓  𝑗 = 𝑗
 
Where the company fixed effects are denoted by 𝜇𝑖 and yearly fixed effects by 𝜃𝑡. The 
parameter 𝛽𝑗 is the treatment effect j time periods before or after the event, j ≤ 0  or j ≥ 0 
respectively. 𝑏𝑖,𝑡
𝑗
 is the indicators for the event and binned event endpoints factoring in 
designed 3 year leads and lags. 𝑑𝑖,𝑡 is the indicator for the event year, taking the value of 1 in 
the year of event treatment and 0 otherwise. For normalization purposes the event indicator 
for 𝛽−1 is set to 0. Restricting the effect window to leads 𝑗, and lags 𝑗 equal to 3 implies that 
the treatment effect before or after j=3 remain constant.  
The purpose of this method is to determine the relationship between gender diversity not only 
during an event period itself but also the effect diversity has leading up to and event and into 
the future. Findings of the following fixed effects distributed-lag models will aim to address 
these relationships and uncover more information behind their possible causality. Gasparrini 
et al. uses this the DLM model to account for complex non-linear and delayed associations to 
describe exposure lag-response associations between public health interventions (Gasparrini 
& Leone, 2014). This research dives deeper into the method described by Scmediheiny and 
Seigloch as well as discussing the attributable risk behind such methodologies. Another study 
conducted by Gasparrini et al. used distributed lag non-linear models to examine the 
(7) 
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relationships behind temperature and mortality to determine the delayed effects of temperature 
on mortality rates (Gasparrini & Armstrong, 2010). Using DLM models we will examine the 
delayed and future effects of illegal activities on board gender diversity. 




The following section presents the results of the board analysis event study on the 73 
companies of interest. Explaining the findings for the relationships between board diversity 
and suggested potential of engaging in illegal activities. 
Using the list of suspected vs not suspected companies generated from the financial event 
study, a high-level overview of board diversity differentiation of suspected vs not suspected 
companies is shown in Figure 3. The figure depicts the mean board diversity in each year for 
suspected and not suspected companies. Intuitively the board diversity percentage is 
increasing for both groups due to cooperate equality measures, but interestingly suspected 
companies show a more accelerated increase in mean board diversity parentage than non-
suspected companies.  
Figure 3: The yearly mean board diversity for suspected companies (determined from event studies) & 
yearly board diversity for companies not suspected of illegal activities. 
 
The following analysis focuses on the relationships between suspected intracompany illegal 
instances generated from the event studies and their corresponding board diversities at time of 
suspicion. The analysis first looks at the simple linear relationship and progresses into more 
advanced forms of fixed effects regression and distributed-lag models.  
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Before performing more in-depth analysis regarding the leading and lagging effects of 
diversity on illegal activity, simple OLS and fixed effects regressions are completed. The 
purpose of this portion of the study is to analyze the direct relationship between diversity and 
illegal activities and if these are significant and directional. Table 4 shows the standard OLS 
regression of illegal instances vs diversity (1), the company fixed effects regression (2), and 
the company and year fixed effects regression (3).  
Table 4: Regression summary for OLS (1), company fixed effects (2), company and year fixed effects (3) 









Regarding the OLS regression seen in column (1) the diversity is significant in relationship to 
the presence (or absence) of an illegal instance determined from the financial event study. 
Without any unit or time-based fixed effects, a reduced diversity by 0.005% is expected in the 
presence of an illegal instance. To account for company and year based cofounding factors a 
fixed effects analysis is conducted. Looking at the relationship between the illegal event 
predictor variable and the diversity outcome variable within each company. Because of the 
company specific characteristics that may or may not be influencing the predictor, eliminating 
these will allow for a more precise determination of the relationship of interest. Two variants 
of fixed effects regression are examined, both of which look at the relationship between 
diversity and illegal events and have standard errors clustered on a company level. The 
difference between the two is that the first examines only company fixed effects where the 
second examines both year and company fixed effects. The company fixed effects regression 
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also shows a diversity coefficient that is significant and portrays a 0.010% decrease in diversity 
in the presence of an illegal event. However, when incorporating both company and yearly 
fixed effects, the diversity coefficient is no longer significant and shows a coefficient of 
0.003% which is much smaller than the previous company based fixed effects regression. This 
0.007% difference implies that the 0.010 coefficient in the company fixed effects regression 
is driven by the year specific effect. The reduction in beta estimation with regards to the illegal 
parameter along with the lack of statistical significance implies that when company and year 
based fixed effects are incorporated into a model diversity percentage does not have a strong 
relationship with the presence of suspected illegal activity. 
The purpose behind the following Distributed lag models are to examine the relationship and 
effect that diversity has on the illegal activities prior or post to an illegal event itself. The 
regression output in Table 5 represents the regression of illegal activity flags determined from 
the event study against diversity zero, one, two, and three years both ahead and behind the 
illegal event. For the purpose of normalization discussed earlier the year prior to the illegal 
instance is left out of the regression. Output (1) corresponds to running the regression on the 
overall board diversity percentages and output (2) is the same technique run on the raw number 


























When analyzing the distributed-lag model on diversity percentage the degree of diversity is 
not significant. The coefficient still depicts a negative relationship like all previous models 
and has the same magnitude as the company and year fixed effects regression in columns (3) 
of Table 4. The lagged diversity percentage variables, denoted by the coefficient ending in 
“P” show no significance as well as the leading diversity variables denoted by “F” at the end 
of the coefficient in Table 5. Interestingly all leading and lagging values except for 2 leads 
post illegal event all have positive coefficients. Indicating that as diversity percentage 
increases there is an increase for illegal activity in the future as well as if an illegal event 
occurs there is likely to be high gender diversity in the future. The model in column (2) of 
Table 5 uses the same methodology but with raw female board members instead of board 
diversity and uses board size as a control variable. The results are almost identical with the 
difference being the magnitude of coefficients due to the measurement unit magnitude 
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differences. Surprisingly the board size control variable shows a negative coefficient (although 
not significant), introducing some questions into whether board size regardless of diversity 
may affect probability of engaging in illegal activities. The distributed lag model indicates that 
there is a smaller board size in the presence of illegal events. 
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5 Discussion 
From our analysis and for the companies we investigated, we can determine that gender 
diversity in a company's board of directors does not influence a company's propensity to 
engage in illegal arms trading. This is evident from linear regression and fixed effect 
regression performed in our analysis. When performing a simple linear regression between the 
illegal event chains and the gender diversity of the companies at that point in time we observe 
gender diversity as a significant variable. The same effects are observed when fixed effects at 
the company level are removed. However, when incorporating both company and year fixed 
effects the influence of illegal arms trading is less impactful on-board diversity and appears as 
if the significance found in the company fixed effects analysis is attributed to year based 
confounding effects. This leads us to believe that gender diversity alone is a poor indicator in 
determining a company's likelihood of illegal arms dealing. This is because there are likely 
many factors attributing to a company’s decision to engage in illegal weapons sales that vary 
in degree of impact. This makes it difficult to isolate one characteristic of a company that will 
indicate its willingness to engage in illegal weapons dealing. Analyzing one of many variables 
associated with the operations of a company leaves a large room for error and cofounding 
effects.  
Though it is worthwhile to try and understand gender diversity's role in a company's likelihood 
of engaging in illegal arms trading, it should be noted that the factors contributing to these 
actions are more complex than attributing them to one sole factor alone. Removing company 
variability through the fixed effects regression has demonstrated that gender diversity likely 
plays a larger role at the individual company level. Each company’s internal and external 
dynamics will determine how large of a role gender diversity will have in their propensity to 
engage in illegal arms trading. 
The analysis conducted so far is solely observational, and the examination from of the 
relationship between illegal activity and diversity is not causal. To examine the causational 
relationship between these metrics the assumption that companies that are willing to violate 
arms embargos are not fluctuating the diversity of the board because of the presence of illegal 
activities must be proven. Confirming this assumption would indicate that the hiring practices 
around board composition is random with respect to illegal activities and therefore causal 
estimates from the regression analysis can be concluded. The analysis conducted, including 
the above regression analyses, does not address this possible relationship between hiring 
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practices and illegal activities. First to address the pitfalls of the above analysis without the 
above assumption validation we must examine the econometric assumptions and correlations 
behind the coefficient estimates of the fixed effects and distributed lag models. In particular, 
the estimation of β in the above models are made under the assumption that error term of the 
regression model is uncorrelated with the regressor x (University of Leicester, 2020). In the 
context of econometrics, in which this study is heavily sectioned in, this assumption is difficult 
to ensure. In most cases the disturbance term is likely to be compounded from the variable 
omitted from the regression of y in terms of x (Pearson, 1896). If this is the case the coefficient 
generated from the regression to limit the disturbance term will result in an estimator that is 
biased due to the model attributing the relationships of missing variables to the variables 
present (Hanck, 2020). With respect to our analysis this inhibits the uncovering of the true β 
estimation for diversity and limits the conclusion of diversity directly affecting illegal 
activities and not some unlisted variables. 
While we recognize the weaknesses of our regression model’s ability to predict, our model 
also has a causal interpretation. It may be expected that increasing gender diversity by one 
standard deviation would reduce the probability that a company would commit a crime. This 
is due to the perception that female presence will improve moral judgment, resulting in the 
company having a lower propensity to engage in illegal arms transactions. This would only be 
true if gender diversity were exogenous to crime. Conversely, if gender diversity were 
endogenous to crime, we would observe an increase in gender diversity correlated to an 
increase in crime. This would suggest that companies are hiring more women in their board 
of directors in an attempt to improve their image and mask their illicit activities. Our team has 
observed no significant results, meaning that either there is no relationship between illegal 
arms trading and gender diversity or that relationship is being masked by causal effects of 
increased gender diversity on a company’s board of directors. We believe it is possible that 
companies in our dataset are embracing the more nuanced hiring practices of increased gender 
diversity in their board of directors in an effort to disguise their illegal activity and improve 
public perception. This results in a positive correlation and endogenous relationship between 
crime and gender diversity. However, it is also possible that for companies in the dataset their 
hiring practices are exogenous with respect to crime. This could imply a negative correlation 
between crime and gender diversity such that as more women are hired to the board of 
directors’ crime is reduced. These negative and positive relationships occurring 
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simultaneously may be the reason we are observing close to zero significance in our 
regressions.  
To ensure we are observing a true causal effect of gender diversity on crime, we need to 
demonstrate that gender diversity is exogenous. To achieve this, we need to find a reform that 
impacts gender diversity but does not have any influence on crime. For this, our team decided 
to look at companies in our dataset that are headquartered in countries that have instituted 
gender quotas for publicly and state owned companies. These countries include Italy, France, 
Australia, India, Israel, and Germany. This would mean that the gender diversity of companies 
located in these countries would be random with respect to crime. As a result, we would be 
observing gender diversity being influenced by societal and political factors and can assume 
it is exogenous. Using companies headquartered in these countries we can then determine a 
causal link between gender diversity and illegal weapons trading. 
However, for our dataset we have some limitations that will lead to inconclusive results. 
Firstly, of the companies in our dataset very few are headquartered in countries that have 
instituted gender quotas, leaving our team with a small sample size. Another limitation is that 
many of the countries have only recently legislated gender quotas and have only recached 
compliance as early as 2019. This leaves our team with very little data to perform an analysis 
with as well as uncertainty as to when individual companies have met legislation requirements.  
Legislation such as gender quotas have obvious benefits such as increased representation of 
women in largely male dominated boards. For example, prior to gender quotas being instituted 
in Italy, the average share of women on the boards of directors of publicly listed companies in 
2009 was 7%, one of the lowest in Europe (Ferrari, 2016). There are also positive trickle-down 
effects observed as a result of gender quotas. One such effect is positive stock price reaction 
to the appointment of a female director in U.S companies (Rosenstein and Wyatt, 1990). 
Another benefit of increased female representation on board of director’s due to gender quotas 
has been associated with a lower variability of stock market prices (Ferrari 2016). It should 
also be noted that gender quotas can produce some inadvertently negative effects. It has been 
observed that when females are appointed to boards of directors voluntarily, there are positive 
stock price reactions. However, when boards are mandated, negative stock price reactions are 
observed. This demonstrates that policy related to gender diversity has man inherent benefits 




The aim of this thesis was to investigate the relationship between gender diversity on the 
boards of weapons companies and violating arms embargos. Using an events study approach 
designed by Stefano Della Vinga and Eliana La Ferrara and data from ACLED and 
DataStream companies suspected of violating arms embargos were determined through 
abnormal returns and a constant mean model. The analysis yielded 36 company-country 
specific instances where three or more abnormal returns around event dates were found to be 
significant. Of these 36 instances there 33 unique companies. 
Using companies flagged through the event study analysis, board diversity relationships were 
examined. Using company specific social, governance, and environmental data also captured 
on DataStream and fixed effects regression studies the relationship between board gender 
diversity and suspected arms embargo violations is examined. 
The analyses show that there is some relationship between board diversity and arms embargo 
violations. A simple OLS regression that is unable to account for confounding effects 
concludes that there is a significant relationship between board diversity and embargo 
violations. Showing a 0.005% decrease in board diversity in the presence of an illegal instance. 
When eliminating the confounding effects company specific variation, the relationship still 
holds true, showing a significance relationship between diversity and illegal events. With a 
0.010% decrease in board gender diversity in the presence of an event study illegal instance. 
However, when incorporating year based confounding effects in addition to company specific 
variations the relationship between the two variables does not hold significance. Displaying a 
non-significant coefficient of -0.003% or a decrease in diversity percentage by 0.003% in the 
presence of an illegal flag. This implies that the significance and magnitude of the company 
fixed effects model is being driven by the year specific confounding effects. When looking at 
the leading and lagging effects of board diversity we also see a non-significant relationships 
between three leads/lags around the illegal event.   
This thesis makes a helpful contribution in demonstrating the importance and relevance behind 
analyzing company characteristics to aid in the otherwise manual review process for arms 
embargo violations. Event and relational studies provide a means to narrow down companies 
of suspicion to aid in regulators ability to enforce arms embargos and detect violations. 
Advance in this field of research will hopefully provide the ability to flag and review 
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companies of suspicion and reduce overall manpower needed to properly enforce such crucial 
laws.  
Although the results only focus on board diversity it is clear that more metrics are needed to 
better understand an organization’s ability and likelihood to participate in illegal weapons 
trading. This idea is the one of the main drawbacks of this approach, looking at gender 
diversity exclusively doesn’t allow for more advance mapping of company-based descriptors 
that may also be playing a role. A second drawback to the approach sued in this thesis is the 
need for companies to both be publicly traded as well as having sufficient information 
pertaining to board structure. If both these conditions are not met it become hard to extract 
relational meaning and subsequently use findings to aid in the detection and apprehension of 
companies violating arms embargos. 
Moving forward to try and combat some of the shortfalls of this thesis we urge future research 
to focus on a more inclusive focus on a company’s organizational culture. Trying to identify 
key performance metrics that may capture a company’s viewpoint illegal trading and 
incorporating them all into relational model. It would also be worthwhile to investigate the 
presence of a causal relationship between crime and gender diversity. 
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Appendix II: Descriptions of chosen events along with their corresponding dates and location 
of occurrence.  
Date  Country  Event  
5/25/2009 Sudan  
Army base town Umm Baru 
has fallen under JEM control. 
Umm Baru about 100 km 
from frontier with Chad ( 
unable to find on 
Fallingrain). 
7/13/2009 
Democratic Republic of 
Congo 
A government attack on a 
rebel position displaces 
civilians. 
8/19/2009 
Democratic Republic of 
Congo 
The Democratic Republic of 
Congo military said Saturday 
it had killed or captured more 
than 500 Rwandan Hutu 
rebels in the country’s east 
since launching an offensive 
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against them six weeks ago. 
Fatalities broken up with 
previous events. 
11/20/2009 
Democratic Republic of 
Congo  
Over 100 killed in clashes 
among ethnic groups. 8,000 
displaced. 
12/14/2009 
Democratic Republic of 
Congo 
Democratic Republic of 
Congo forces have retaken 
control of Dongo in the 
countrys north-west where 
recent tribal clashes erupted 
in between the Lobala (or 
Enyele) tribe and the 
Bomboma people. The town 
was taken back from an army 
of Enyele led by an animist 
priest named Udjani. 
12/31/2009 
Democratic Republic of 
Congo 
157 insurgents and one 
soldier from the Congolese 
army, known as the FARDC, 
were killed in and around the 
town of Inyele between Dec. 




Sheikh Hassan Turki of HI in 
Baidoa for unity talks with 
AS. O1/HI vs. 
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2/10/2010 Sudan 
SLM repels attacking 
government troops. No rebel 
fatality number available. 
3/10/2010 
Democratic Republic of 
Congo 
FARDC have killed 90 
Rwandan Hutu rebels since 
launching a new offensive 
late last month. UN troops 
are backing the DR Congo 
army in the operation dubbed 
"Amani Leo" ("Peace Now" 
in Swahili). 
4/23/2010 Sudan 
Clashes somewhere on the 
border between Darfur and 
Bahr al Ghazal. Rizaiqat 
report unconfirmed. SPLA 
claims it fought SAF. 
Unclear how many killed on 
each side. 80 wounded. 
5/13/2010 Sudan 





between SSC militia/group 
and Somaliland government 
started in Widh-widh. 
1/28/2011 Egypt 
On January 28, tens of 
thousands of demonstrators 
took to the streets of 
Alexandria, Suez, and Cairo, 
the capital. Police responded 
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with tear gas, water cannons, 
rubber bullets, and live 
ammunition in an effort to 
prevent protesters from 
advancing towards the 
central squares of those 
cities. The Ministry of Health 
said 846 persons died during 
the protests in January and 
February. Most of these were 
killed on January 28 and 29. 
2/28/2011 Sudan 
Fighting between rival rebel 
groups kills 92 and injures 
164. Twelve civilians were 
killed in the crossfire. 
3/28/2011 Libya 
Three Gaddafi fighter killed 
during fighting, bringing the 
total of dead to 117 dead and 
1,300 wounded after a week 
of fighting. 
4/20/2011 Sudan 
Rebels from the newly 
formed SSLM/A of Peter 
Gadet in south Sudans oil-
rich Unity state continued for 




spokesman claims Gaddafi 
forces have killed 190 rebels 
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in three days. Positions not 
reported. 
8/18/2011 South Sudan 
Cattle raiders of the Murle 
ethnic group crossed the 
border from Sudan, raided 
and looted five 
unincorporated entites and 
clashed with government 
forces. 
9/22/2011 Sudan 
The SPLA reports that 30 of 
their soldiers were killed and 
60 members of the Sudanese 
military were killed during 
clashes. The SPLA were 
eventually forced to retreat 
from the location. 
10/20/2011 Somalia 
Al Shabaab 20 Oct claimed 
to have killed over 70 AU 
troops. 
2/1/2012 Egypt 
On 1 February 2012, a 
massive riot occurred at Port 
Said Stadium in Port Said, 
Egypt, following an Egyptian 
Premier League football 
match between El Masry and 
El Ahly. 74 people were 
killed and more than 500 
were injured after thousands 
of El Masry spectators 
stormed the stadium stands 
and the pitch. El Ahly ultras 
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claim that they were 
specifically targeted given 
their vocal highly televised 
calls for the SCAF to step 
down, as well as their open 
mockery of the previous 
regime and the SCAF. The 
ultras were one of the largest 
organized bodies of 
resistance in street protests 





Southern forces launch an 
attack on government forces 
near al Aabyad, breaking the 
armistice agreement. 150 
Sudanese killed.  
4/18/2012 Central African Republic 
Tripartite CAR/Sudan/Chad 
force attacked by Sudanese 
SLM/A Minnawi rebels on 
their base in Am-Dafok in a 
cross-border ambush. At 
least 78 people were killed, 
including 11 CAR and 65 
Sudanese soldiers. Two 
Sudanese soldiers were also 
abducted. 
6/18/2012 Libya 
Medical sources at Gharyan 
hospital announced the 
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killing of 62 persons and the 
injury of 137 others in the 
wake of the continuing 
clashes. 
8/14/2012 Somalia 
Kenya Defence Forces 
(KDF) who are battling in 
southern Somalia have killed 
73 Al Shabaab militants and 
recovered 40 wounded.  
9/10/2012 Sudan 
The Sudanese Revolutionary 
Front (SRF) announced 
defeating government forces 
and militias in Fanga area, 
East Jebel.  
10/17/2012 Sudan 
SRF announces the killing of 
dozens of pro-government 
militia and claims control of 
Abu-Delek area.  
11/2/2012 Sudan 
70 government troops are 
killed and 150 injured in a 
battle initiated in village of 
Del Daako , Dalko area, NE 
of Kadugli. 6 SPLM-N 
soldiers are also killed. 
Rebels keep hold of territory.  
12/3/2012 Somalia 
Peace agreement/talks: Al 
Shabaab brokers peace 
between warring Saleban and 
Duduble clans in Galguduud. 
Under the peace deal, the 
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clans agreed to end hostilities 
and to compensate each other 
using diya (blood money) 
system. 
4/15/2013 Sudan 
Sudan Liberation Movement 
faction led by Minni 
Minnawi (SLM-MM) 
claimed on Sunday killing 43 
Sudanese soldiers and the 
capture of a new area in 
South Darfur, "strategic" 
area of Donki Draissa located 
on the road near the capital 
Nyala. 
6/26/2013 Sudan 
Renewed violence between 
Abbala and Beni Hussein 
tribesmen left "dozens" dead 
and injured on Wednesday in 
North Darfur.  
7/29/2013 Sudan 
Fighting between rival Arab 
tribes in Sudans Darfur 
region spread on Monday, 
after clashes last week left 
scores dead, a leader of one 
of the tribes said. 
9/25/2013 Sudan 
The director of Omdurman 
hospital Osama Mortada told 
the BBCs Arabic Service that 
21 people sent to his hospital 
had died as a result of police 
use of violence to dispurse 
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rioters, and that about 80 
were injured. Later reports 
state that in Omdurman at 
least 79 people were fatally 
hit by bullets in the head and 
the chest. 
10/28/2013 Sudan 
At least 75 people were 
reportedly killed and dozens 
wounded in renewed violent 
clashes between the 
Misseriya and Salamat tribes, 
3km west of Mukjar in 
Central Darfur.  
12/5/2013 Central African Republic 
Anti-Balaka, accompanied 
by ex-FACA, coordinated 
attacks in PK12, Kasai and 
the Boy Rabe neighbourhood 
in Bangui, sparking clashes 
with ex-Seleka. Fighting then 
spread across Bangui, 
resulting in the deaths of at 
least 394 people between the 
5th and 7th of December. 
4/17/2014 South Sudan 
Cattle rustling by attackers 
wearing SPLM-IO uniforms 
in Alabek, Tonj left 113 
people dead (85 attackers and 
28 civilians). Police fought 
with the cattle raiders. 
8/15/2014 South Sudan 
Government and rebel forces 
clashed in Ayod, Jonglei 
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state. The army reported that 
the rebels attacked 
government positions, and 
that 120 rebels and 6 soldiers 
were killed. 
9/22/2014 Libya 
Brigades from Gharyan 
shelled the Bir Ghanem 
camp, a stronghold of Zintan 
affiliated brigades of al-Qaqa 
and al-Sawaeiq. Al-Aziziyah 
was the site of heavy 
fighting, with the Bin 
Ghanam Camp sustaining 
heavy shelling. According to 
an announcement made by 
Libya Dawn on social media, 
the town itself is now 
considered a military zone 
and all residents have been 
urged to leave. According to 
the Libya Observer at least 
180 fighters were killed in 
two days of fighting and 12 
others injured. 
10/7/2014 Somalia 
Kenyan AMISOM forces kill 
a reported 60 members of al 
Shabaab and recovered five 
vehicles during a battle in 
Buulo Gaduud. The 
operation included a series of 
air strikes. The AMISOM 
effort was launched to 
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liberate the area, which was 
ultimately successful. 
10/27/2014 South Sudan 
The Unity state goverment 
announced rebel forces have 
captured Kilo 30 (Sikasik) 
after launching an attack on 
government forces near 
Bentiu. 
1/5/2015 Libya 
Petroleum Facilities Guards 
(PFG) claimed that 77 
members of Libya Dawns 
Operation Sunrise were 
killed in fighting at Wadi 
Ikhila, east of Bin-Jawad. 
The main Sunrise forces 
were forced to pull back into 
central Bin-Jawad. 
3/13/2015 Sudan 
SLM/A-Nur claimed to have 
captured Rokerro, destroying 
the SAF garrison in the area 
and killing 68 soldiers. 
4/22/2015 Yemen 
In Marib, Houthi-Saleh 
forces took control of the 
strategic camp of Kawfal, 
headquarters of the mutinied 
312th Armored Brigade. This 
came after violent clashes 
with the mutinied Brigade 
led by Colonel Abdo Rabbo 
al-Shadadi, loyal to the fled 
Maj. Gen. Ali Mohsin al-
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Ahmar, and allied Islah and 
Al Qaeda militants. At least 
75 people were killed in 
Marib that day. 18 reported 
fatalities at Mas Military 
Camp coded in another 
event. Remaining 57 
fataltiies coded here. 
5/27/2015 South Sudan 
Following the discovery of 
the bodies of two Dinka 
soldiers, 60 are killed in 
clashes between Dinka 
herders and Moru and Jur 
locals. 
6/12/2015 Sudan 
Clashes between SPLM-N 
and military. Rebels capture 
Wad Abakr for a few hours 
before withdrawing. 57 
soldiers killed. 
7/1/2015 Egypt 
At least 205 suspected State 
of Sinai militants have been 
killed by security forces 
between Jul.1-3, following 
the coordinated attacks the 
group carried out on Jul.1 
(144 coded in other events). 
8/3/2015 Yemen 
On August 3, coalition-
backed Southern Resistance 
forces recaptured the Al 
Anad airbase after fierce 
clashes with Houthi forces. 
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3,000 ground troops, 
including Saudi and Emirati 
special forces, participated in 
the battle. The clashes killed 
40 pro-Houthi soldiers and 
24 Southern Resistance 
soldiers, and injured 24 
others including 1 Saudi 
soldier. **Other reports say 
that up to 70 pro-Houthi 
forces were killed. 
9/14/2015 South Sudan 
Clashes between military and 
SPLA/M-IO in Duar. 12 
soldiers killed, 28 wounded, 
and 50 rebels killed. 
1/7/2016 Iraq 
On January 7, Iraqi forces 
killed 75 Islamic State 
militants west of the Al-
Thurthar district in Anbar 
province (coded at provincial 
capital). 
10/3/2016 Libya 
Between 55-80 Islamic State 
militants were killed in Sirte 
on 2 October. 8 Bunyan 
Marsous soldiers (Operation 
Solid Structure)were killed, 
57 wounded and a Dutch 
photojournalist was also 
killed after being shot 
through the chest by an 
Islamic State (IS) sniper. 
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10/24/2016 Iraq 
On Oct 24, the joint Iraqi 
forces from the army, police, 
and peshmerga renewed 
operations along several axes 
in Mosul and attacked IS 
positions, and recaptured 9 
villages northeast of Mosul, 
and killed at least 299 
militants and destroyed 20 
vehicles bombs and 45 
bombs (79 fatalities coded in 
other events). This included 
the Peshmerga forces 
capturing three villages 
(Ibrahim al-Khalil, Al-
Adalah and Kani Harami) 
near Mosul where they killed 
51 militants, and destroyed 
three vehicles and 23 
explosive devices. 
11/14/2016 Iraq 
On 12 November 2016, 
Peshmerga forces, supported 
by Yazidi militias, had 
recaptured Bashiqah from 
ISIL elements in cooperation 
with Global coalition forces 
who backed Peshmerga 
forces with helicopter 
aircraft. 100 ISIL elements 
have been reportedly killed 
in the liberation phase of 
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Bashiqah (22 fatalities coded 
in previous events). 
7/24/2017 Afghanistan 
74 anti-government militias 
(suspected Taliban members) 
were killed in operations 
conducted by Afghan 
security troops in different 
parts of Faryab province. 
11/6/2017 Syria 
Clashes took place between 
Syrian Democratic Forces, 
supported by Coalition 
airstrikes, against Islamic 
State fighters in areas of the 
northern and northeastern 
countryside of Deir-ez-Zor 
city, where QSD forces 
advanced to control at least 4, 
and possibly up to 6, new 
villages under the cover of 
shelling. At least 75 
individuals died during the 
clashes in the governorate. 
1/9/2018 Afghanistan 
Security officials reported on 
January 13, 2018 (coded over 
the previous week), that 132 
Taliban fighters had been 
killed (53 coded in separate 
events) and 80 wounded in 
joint Afghan and NATO 




On February 4th, 80 Taliban 
militants were killed, and 30 
more wounded, during joint 
Afghan air and ground 
operations to retake control 
of Gormach district, Faryab 
province. However, by the 
end of the operation, Taliban 
retained controlled of the 
district. 
4/26/2018 Syria 
Clashes took place between 
regime and allied militias 
against IS fighters in areas on 
the southern outskirts of 
Damascus city, killing at 
least 74 regime and allied 
militia forces and 59 IS 
fighters. 
7/6/2018 South Sudan 
On 6th July, raiders from the 
Murle ethnic group attacked 
members of the Jieh ethnic 
group, in Jubel Bum county 
in Boma state (Jonglei). 
According to the Boma state 
minister for local 
government, 86 people were 
killed (across both sides), 
whilst 14 Jieh and 9 Murle 
were injured. He also stated 
that 42,000 heads of cattle 
were stolen, and that 
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allegedly military generals 
were involved. 
10/8/2018 Afghanistan 
As reported on Oct 8, joint 
Afghan and NATO military 
forces conducted ground and 
air raids against the Taliban 
in Shirin Tagab district, 
Faryab province and 
Charbolak district, Balkh 
province. 113 militants were 
killed. 11 were arrested, and 
9 were wounded. Taliban 
sources claimed 1 Afghan 
soldier was killed in the 
clashes. 114 fatalities coded 
across two events. 
11/5/2018 Yemen 
 National Resistance forces, 
with coalition air support, 
took control of Al Matahen 
junction and the Red Sea 
Four Mills at al Mataheen in 
Al Hali district, Al Hudaydah 
governorate after clashes 
with Houthi forces. Reports 
said that 53 Houthi fighters 
and 13 anti-Houthi fighters 
were killed on the 5 
November 2018 as anti-
Houthi fighters took control 
of Madinat Amal and the Red 
Sea Mills factory. 
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12/17/2018 Yemen 
Anti-Houthi Giants Brigade 
forces and local Zaraniq 
tribesmen claimed to have 
thwarted an attack of as many 
as 300 pro-Houthi fighters 
east of Durayhimi, south of 
Hodeidah city in western 
Yemen, killing 50 fighters 
and injuring 60 others. 8 anti-
Houthi fighters were also 
reported killed. 
3/15/2019 Afghanistan 
As reported on March 16th, 
over 24 hours, Afghan 
military forces conducted 
operations against suspected 
Taliban and/or IS militants in 
Murghab district, Badghis 
province. 51 militants were 
killed and tens of weapons 
were destroyed. 
5/16/2019 Egypt 
On May 16, Military Forces 
announced that 47 suspected 
IS militants and five soldiers 
were killed and 4 wounded 
during clashes in Sinai. 300 
explosives were defused and 
many weapons seized during 
the operations. Military Air 
Forces reportedly claimed 
the destruction of 30 
hideouts. (location of clashes 
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unknown- coded as Al Arish 
geoprecision 3). 
6/26/2019 Libya 
 On June 26, GNA forces 
backed by airstrikes fully 
recaptured the town of 
Gharyan from the LNA, the 
town functioned as the main 
forward operating base and 
harbored the central 
operations room. Nine GNA 
fighters were killed in the 
process of recapturing 
Gharyan while GNA forces 
arrested 150 LNA militiamen 
and mercenaries, and seized 
advanced weaponry, 
vehicles, drones, and other 
equipment. A number of 
wounded LNA militiamen 
were said to have been 
executed at the Gharyan 
Hospital and LNA 
acknolwedged that it lost 43 
fighters. 
8/19/2019 Syria 
On 18 August, 2019, clashes 
took place between regime 
and pro-regime militia forces 
including the Tiger forces 
against opposition and 
Islamist factions in the 
northwestern outskirts of 
Khan Shaykun in southern 
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Idleb countryside amid 
Syrian and Russian airstrikes 
and an exchange of shelling 
barrages between both sides. 
As clashes continued, HTS 
detonated a SVBIED and 
regime forces and their allied 
forces achieved some 
advances and entered the 
city. As a result of the 
clashes, 62 opposition and 
Islamist fighters and 35 
regime and allied fighters 
were killed. 2 civilians were 
also killed by a Russian 
airstrike. Total fatalities 
coded to 100 to account for 
the HTS suicide operative. 
10/24/2019 Afghanistan 
As reported on October 25 
2019, over the past 24 hours, 
62-63 Taliban militants were 
killed and 13-15 were 
wounded by Afghan and 
NATO forces attacks and 
airstrikes in Chishti Sharif 
district, Herat. 
11/29/2019 South Sudan 
On 29 November 2019, the 
Gak and Manuer sections of 
the Pakam Dinka clan 
clashed once again in or near 
Maper (Lakes state). Reports 
indicate at least 56 were 
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killed (some of whom may 
have died of injuries from the 
previous clash on 27 
November), and that over 
100 were injured between 
this clash and the clash on 27 
November. UN peacekeepers 
have been deployed to Mapel 
from Rumbek. 
12/18/2019 Central African Republic 
On 18 December 2019, 
armed clashes took place 
between MLCJ and FPRC in 
Bihera, close from Birao (12 
km). At least 59 figthers were 
killed and 12 others injured, 
mainly from the MLCJ. 
1/9/2020 
Democratic Republic of 
Congo 
On 9 January 2020, FARDC 
took back Madina (Beni) 
from the ADF. 40 fighters 
and 30 FARDC were killed 
during these clashes 70 other 
soldiers were injured . 
2/27/2020 Syria 
On 27 February 2020, 
opposition and Islamist 
factions and Turkish forces 
captured Saraqab and the 
nearby Shapur Farm in Idleb 
following clashes with 
regime and pro-regime 
militia forces amid Russian 
airstrikes and Turkish 
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shelling. During the clashes, 
25 opposition and Islamist 
fighters were killed while 
regime and loyal forces 
suffered 36 fatalities. Total 
fatalities coded to 61. 
 
Appendix III: Company reactions corresponding to events in embargoed countries.  
Country Name Reactions 
Sudan Kawasaki Heavy Industries 5 
Sudan 
L3HARRIS 
TECHNOLOGIES INC 5 
Sudan ThyssenKrupp 5 
Sudan Amphenol Corp. 4 
Sudan Leidos 4 
Sudan Meggitt 4 
Sudan Melrose Industries 4 
Sudan Mitsubishi Electric Corp. 4 
Sudan Mitsubishi Heavy Industries 4 
Sudan Rolls-Royce 4 
Sudan ST Engineering 4 
Sudan WOOSU AMS CO LTD 4 
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Democratic Republic of 
Congo 
KRATOS DEFENSE AND 
SECURITY SOLUTIONS 3 
Democratic Republic of 
Congo Leidos 3 
Democratic Republic of 
Congo Northrop Grumman Corp. 3 
Egypt Thales 3 
Libya IHI Corp. 3 
Libya 
KRATOS DEFENSE AND 
SECURITY SOLUTIONS 3 
South Sudan Amphenol Corp. 3 
South Sudan KBR 3 
South Sudan Oshkosh Corp. 3 
Sudan AECOM 3 
Sudan Airbus Group 3 
Sudan Bharat Electronics 3 
Sudan CACI International 3 
Sudan Dassault Aviation 3 
Sudan Fujitsu 3 
Sudan Honeywell International 3 
Sudan Jacobs Engineering Group 3 
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Sudan 
KRATOS DEFENSE AND 
SECURITY SOLUTIONS 3 
Sudan L3 Technologies 3 
Sudan QinetiQ 3 
Sudan Raytheon 3 
Sudan Rheinmetall 3 
Sudan Serco Group 3 
Sudan ViaSat 3 
Afghanistan BAE Systems 2 
Afghanistan L3 Technologies 2 
Afghanistan Leonardo 2 
Afghanistan Meggitt 2 
Afghanistan Mitsubishi Heavy Industries 2 
Afghanistan Saab 2 
Afghanistan Teledyne Technologies 2 
Democratic Republic of 
Congo AECOM 2 
Democratic Republic of 
Congo Austal 2 
Democratic Republic of 
Congo General Dynamics Corp. 2 
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Democratic Republic of 
Congo Jacobs Engineering Group 2 
Democratic Republic of 
Congo L3 Technologies 2 
Democratic Republic of 
Congo Lockheed Martin Corp. 2 
Democratic Republic of 
Congo Melrose Industries 2 
Democratic Republic of 
Congo NEC Corp. 2 
Democratic Republic of 
Congo Raytheon 2 
Democratic Republic of 
Congo Rolls-Royce 2 
Democratic Republic of 
Congo Thales 2 
Egypt Airbus Group 2 
Egypt Boeing 2 
Egypt Curtiss-Wright Corp. 2 
Egypt Hanwha Aerospace 2 
Egypt Honeywell International 2 
Egypt Leidos 2 
Egypt Raytheon 2 
Egypt Rolls-Royce 2 
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Egypt Safran 2 
Egypt Serco Group 2 
Iraq ManTech International Corp. 2 
Libya BAE Systems 2 
Libya Safran 2 
Libya ThyssenKrupp 2 
Somalia Aerojet Rocketdyne 2 
Somalia IHI Corp. 2 
Somalia Mitsubishi Heavy Industries 2 
Somalia Serco Group 2 
Somalia ST Engineering 2 




South Sudan Ball Corp. 2 
South Sudan Fluor Corp. 2 
South Sudan General Electric 2 
South Sudan Honeywell International 2 
South Sudan Huntington Ingalls Industries 2 
South Sudan IHI Corp. 2 
South Sudan Jacobs Engineering Group 2 
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South Sudan 
KRATOS DEFENSE AND 
SECURITY SOLUTIONS 2 
South Sudan Leonardo 2 
South Sudan Raytheon 2 
South Sudan ViaSat 2 
Sudan Aerojet Rocketdyne 2 
Sudan Austal 2 
Sudan Babcock International Group 2 
Sudan BAE Systems 2 
Sudan Ball Corp. 2 
Sudan CAE 2 
Sudan Curtiss-Wright Corp. 2 
Sudan Fluor Corp. 2 
Sudan General Dynamics Corp. 2 
Sudan Hanwha Aerospace 2 
Sudan KBR 2 
Sudan Moog 2 
Sudan NEC Corp. 2 
Sudan Oshkosh Corp. 2 
Sudan Safran 2 
Sudan Thales 2 
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Sudan TransDigm Group 2 
Yemen Airbus Group 2 
Yemen Hanwha Aerospace 2 
Yemen Honeywell International 2 
Yemen Huntington Ingalls Industries 2 
Yemen Lockheed Martin Corp. 2 
Yemen Moog 2 
Yemen NEC Corp. 2 
Yemen Rolls-Royce 2 
Afghanistan Amphenol Corp. 1 




Afghanistan Babcock International Group 1 
Afghanistan Boeing 1 
Afghanistan BWX Technologies 1 
Afghanistan Fincantieri 1 
Afghanistan Hanwha Aerospace 1 
Afghanistan Korea Aerospace Industries 1 
Afghanistan 
L3HARRIS 
TECHNOLOGIES INC 1 
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Afghanistan Leidos 1 
Afghanistan Melrose Industries 1 
Afghanistan Mitsubishi Electric Corp. 1 
Afghanistan NEC Corp. 1 
Afghanistan QinetiQ 1 
Afghanistan Raytheon 1 
Afghanistan Rolls-Royce 1 
Afghanistan Safran 1 
Afghanistan SMITH WESSON BRANDS 1 
Afghanistan Thales 1 
Afghanistan ThyssenKrupp 1 
Afghanistan TransDigm Group 1 
Afghanistan ViaSat 1 
Central African Republic Austal 1 
Central African Republic Babcock International Group 1 
Central African Republic Ball Corp. 1 
Central African Republic Bharat Electronics 1 
Central African Republic CACI International 1 
Central African Republic Dassault Aviation 1 
Central African Republic Elbit Systems 1 
Central African Republic Fujitsu 1 
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Central African Republic IHI Corp. 1 
Central African Republic Kawasaki Heavy Industries 1 
Central African Republic 
L3HARRIS 
TECHNOLOGIES INC 1 
Central African Republic Leidos 1 
Central African Republic Meggitt 1 
Central African Republic Mitsubishi Electric Corp. 1 
Central African Republic Mitsubishi Heavy Industries 1 
Central African Republic Oshkosh Corp. 1 
Central African Republic Rheinmetall 1 
Central African Republic Serco Group 1 
Central African Republic SMITH WESSON BRANDS 1 
Central African Republic Thales 1 
Central African Republic ThyssenKrupp 1 
Democratic Republic of 
Congo Aerojet Rocketdyne 1 
Democratic Republic of 
Congo Amphenol Corp. 1 
Democratic Republic of 
Congo ASELSAN 1 





Democratic Republic of 
Congo Babcock International Group 1 
Democratic Republic of 
Congo Ball Corp. 1 
Democratic Republic of 
Congo Booz Allen Hamilton 1 
Democratic Republic of 
Congo CACI International 1 
Democratic Republic of 
Congo Elbit Systems 1 
Democratic Republic of 
Congo Fluor Corp. 1 
Democratic Republic of 
Congo Fujitsu 1 
Democratic Republic of 
Congo General Electric 1 
Democratic Republic of 
Congo Honeywell International 1 
Democratic Republic of 
Congo IHI Corp. 1 
Democratic Republic of 
Congo KBR 1 
Democratic Republic of 
Congo Leonardo 1 
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Democratic Republic of 
Congo Meggitt 1 
Democratic Republic of 
Congo QinetiQ 1 
Democratic Republic of 
Congo Rheinmetall 1 
Democratic Republic of 
Congo Saab 1 
Democratic Republic of 
Congo 
Science Applications 
International Corp. 1 
Democratic Republic of 
Congo SMITH WESSON BRANDS 1 
Democratic Republic of 
Congo Teledyne Technologies 1 
Democratic Republic of 
Congo TransDigm Group 1 
Democratic Republic of 
Congo WOOSU AMS CO LTD 1 
Egypt Aerojet Rocketdyne 1 
Egypt Austal 1 
Egypt Babcock International Group 1 
Egypt BAE Systems 1 
Egypt BWX Technologies 1 
Egypt Dassault Aviation 1 
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Egypt Elbit Systems 1 
Egypt Fluor Corp. 1 
Egypt Huntington Ingalls Industries 1 
Egypt Jacobs Engineering Group 1 
Egypt KBR 1 
Egypt 
KRATOS DEFENSE AND 
SECURITY SOLUTIONS 1 
Egypt 
L3HARRIS 
TECHNOLOGIES INC 1 
Egypt Leonardo 1 
Egypt LIG Nex1 1 
Egypt ManTech International Corp. 1 
Egypt Moog 1 
Egypt Northrop Grumman Corp. 1 
Egypt Oshkosh Corp. 1 
Egypt QinetiQ 1 
Egypt Rheinmetall 1 
Egypt Saab 1 
Egypt 
Science Applications 
International Corp. 1 
Egypt Teledyne Technologies 1 
Egypt Vectrus 1 
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Egypt ViaSat 1 
Iraq AECOM 1 
Iraq BAE Systems 1 
Iraq Boeing 1 
Iraq Fujitsu 1 
Iraq General Dynamics Corp. 1 
Iraq Lockheed Martin Corp. 1 
Iraq Mitsubishi Electric Corp. 1 
Iraq Mitsubishi Heavy Industries 1 
Iraq NEC Corp. 1 
Iraq Raytheon 1 
Iraq 
Science Applications 
International Corp. 1 
Iraq TransDigm Group 1 
Libya Airbus Group 1 




Libya Austal 1 
Libya Dassault Aviation 1 
Libya Fluor Corp. 1 
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Libya Honeywell International 1 
Libya Huntington Ingalls Industries 1 
Libya Kawasaki Heavy Industries 1 
Libya Leonardo 1 
Libya Meggitt 1 
Libya Mitsubishi Heavy Industries 1 
Libya Moog 1 
Libya QinetiQ 1 
Libya Rheinmetall 1 
Libya Rolls-Royce 1 
Libya Serco Group 1 




Libya WOOSU AMS CO LTD 1 
Somalia Airbus Group 1 
Somalia Amphenol Corp. 1 
Somalia BAE Systems 1 
Somalia Ball Corp. 1 
Somalia Bharat Electronics 1 
Somalia BWX Technologies 1 
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Somalia Fujitsu 1 
Somalia General Electric 1 
Somalia Hanwha Aerospace 1 
Somalia Honeywell International 1 
Somalia Huntington Ingalls Industries 1 
Somalia Jacobs Engineering Group 1 
Somalia L3 Technologies 1 
Somalia Leidos 1 
Somalia Lockheed Martin Corp. 1 
Somalia ManTech International Corp. 1 
Somalia Moog 1 
Somalia NEC Corp. 1 
Somalia Rolls-Royce 1 
Somalia Saab 1 
Somalia Textron 1 
Somalia ViaSat 1 
South Sudan AECOM 1 
South Sudan Airbus Group 1 
South Sudan Babcock International Group 1 
South Sudan Bharat Electronics 1 
South Sudan Boeing 1 
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South Sudan Curtiss-Wright Corp. 1 
South Sudan Fujitsu 1 
South Sudan Hanwha Aerospace 1 
South Sudan Kawasaki Heavy Industries 1 
South Sudan Korea Aerospace Industries 1 
South Sudan 
L3HARRIS 
TECHNOLOGIES INC 1 
South Sudan LIG Nex1 1 
South Sudan ManTech International Corp. 1 
South Sudan Meggitt 1 
South Sudan Mitsubishi Heavy Industries 1 
South Sudan Moog 1 
South Sudan NEC Corp. 1 
South Sudan Northrop Grumman Corp. 1 
South Sudan QinetiQ 1 
South Sudan Rheinmetall 1 
South Sudan Rolls-Royce 1 
South Sudan Safran 1 
South Sudan 
Science Applications 





South Sudan Teledyne Technologies 1 
South Sudan Textron 1 
South Sudan ThyssenKrupp 1 
South Sudan TransDigm Group 1 
South Sudan Vectrus 1 
Sudan Boeing 1 
Sudan BWX Technologies 1 
Sudan Elbit Systems 1 
Sudan General Electric 1 
Sudan Huntington Ingalls Industries 1 
Sudan IHI Corp. 1 
Sudan Korea Aerospace Industries 1 
Sudan Leonardo 1 
Sudan Lockheed Martin Corp. 1 
Sudan ManTech International Corp. 1 
Sudan Northrop Grumman Corp. 1 




Sudan Textron 1 
Syria AECOM 1 
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Syria Airbus Group 1 
Syria Amphenol Corp. 1 
Syria Boeing 1 
Syria CAE 1 
Syria Curtiss-Wright Corp. 1 
Syria Fincantieri 1 
Syria Fluor Corp. 1 
Syria General Dynamics Corp. 1 
Syria General Electric 1 
Syria Honeywell International 1 
Syria Huntington Ingalls Industries 1 
Syria IHI Corp. 1 
Syria Jacobs Engineering Group 1 
Syria 
L3HARRIS 
TECHNOLOGIES INC 1 
Syria LIG Nex1 1 
Syria Lockheed Martin Corp. 1 
Syria Mitsubishi Heavy Industries 1 
Syria Moog 1 
Syria Rheinmetall 1 
Syria Safran 1 
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Syria Teledyne Technologies 1 
Syria Textron 1 
Syria Thales 1 
Syria ViaSat 1 
Yemen AECOM 1 
Yemen Aerojet Rocketdyne 1 
Yemen Austal 1 
Yemen CACI International 1 
Yemen Dassault Aviation 1 
Yemen Fluor Corp. 1 
Yemen Hindustan Aeronautics 1 
Yemen IHI Corp. 1 
Yemen Jacobs Engineering Group 1 
Yemen Kawasaki Heavy Industries 1 
Yemen Korea Aerospace Industries 1 
Yemen L3 Technologies 1 
Yemen 
L3HARRIS 
TECHNOLOGIES INC 1 
Yemen Leidos 1 
Yemen Leonardo 1 
Yemen LIG Nex1 1 
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Yemen Meggitt 1 
Yemen Mitsubishi Electric Corp. 1 
Yemen Mitsubishi Heavy Industries 1 
Yemen Northrop Grumman Corp. 1 
Yemen QinetiQ 1 
Yemen Rheinmetall 1 
Yemen 
Science Applications 
International Corp. 1 
Yemen ThyssenKrupp 1 
Yemen TransDigm Group 1 
Afghanistan AECOM < 
Afghanistan Austal < 
Afghanistan Bharat Electronics < 
Afghanistan Booz Allen Hamilton < 
Afghanistan CACI International < 
Afghanistan Curtiss-Wright Corp. < 
Afghanistan Dassault Aviation < 
Afghanistan Elbit Systems < 
Afghanistan Fluor Corp. < 
Afghanistan Fujitsu < 
Afghanistan General Dynamics Corp. < 
 71 
Afghanistan General Electric < 
Afghanistan Honeywell International < 
Afghanistan Huntington Ingalls Industries < 
Afghanistan Jacobs Engineering Group < 
Afghanistan Kawasaki Heavy Industries < 
Afghanistan KBR < 
Afghanistan 
KRATOS DEFENSE AND 
SECURITY SOLUTIONS < 
Afghanistan LIG Nex1 < 
Afghanistan Lockheed Martin Corp. < 
Afghanistan ManTech International Corp. < 
Afghanistan Moog < 
Afghanistan Northrop Grumman Corp. < 
Afghanistan Oshkosh Corp. < 
Afghanistan Rheinmetall < 
Afghanistan 
Science Applications 
International Corp. < 
Afghanistan Serco Group < 
Afghanistan ST Engineering < 
Afghanistan Textron < 
Afghanistan Vectrus < 
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Afghanistan WOOSU AMS CO LTD < 
Central African Republic Airbus Group < 
Central African Republic Amphenol Corp. < 
Central African Republic ASELSAN < 
Central African Republic 
ASELSAN ELEKTRONIK 
SANAYI < 
Central African Republic General Electric < 
Central African Republic Hanwha Aerospace < 
Central African Republic Hindustan Aeronautics < 
Central African Republic Honeywell International < 
Central African Republic Lockheed Martin Corp. < 
Central African Republic Melrose Industries < 
Central African Republic Rafael < 
Central African Republic ST Engineering < 
Central African Republic Teledyne Technologies < 
Democratic Republic of 
Congo Airbus Group < 
Democratic Republic of 
Congo BAE Systems < 
Democratic Republic of 
Congo Bharat Electronics < 
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Democratic Republic of 
Congo Dassault Aviation < 
Democratic Republic of 
Congo Hanwha Aerospace < 
Democratic Republic of 
Congo Kawasaki Heavy Industries < 
Democratic Republic of 
Congo LIG Nex1 < 
Democratic Republic of 
Congo ManTech International Corp. < 
Democratic Republic of 
Congo Mitsubishi Heavy Industries < 
Democratic Republic of 
Congo Oshkosh Corp. < 




Democratic Republic of 
Congo ViaSat < 




Egypt Fujitsu < 
Egypt L3 Technologies < 





Egypt Textron < 
Iraq Aerojet Rocketdyne < 
Iraq Amphenol Corp. < 
Iraq Ball Corp. < 
Iraq Fincantieri < 
Iraq Fluor Corp. < 
Iraq General Electric < 
Iraq Hanwha Aerospace < 
Iraq Honeywell International < 
Iraq IHI Corp. < 
Iraq Jacobs Engineering Group < 
Iraq Kawasaki Heavy Industries < 
Iraq KBR < 
Iraq Korea Aerospace Industries < 
Iraq 
KRATOS DEFENSE AND 
SECURITY SOLUTIONS < 
Iraq Meggitt < 
Iraq Oshkosh Corp. < 
Iraq QinetiQ < 
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Iraq Rheinmetall < 




Iraq Textron < 
Iraq ThyssenKrupp < 
Libya AECOM < 
Libya Aerojet Rocketdyne < 
Libya Amphenol Corp. < 
Libya Ball Corp. < 
Libya Boeing < 
Libya Booz Allen Hamilton < 
Libya CACI International < 
Libya Curtiss-Wright Corp. < 
Libya Elbit Systems < 
Libya Fincantieri < 
Libya General Dynamics Corp. < 
Libya General Electric < 
Libya Hanwha Aerospace < 
Libya Jacobs Engineering Group < 




TECHNOLOGIES INC < 
Libya Leidos < 
Libya Lockheed Martin Corp. < 
Libya ManTech International Corp. < 
Libya Melrose Industries < 
Libya Mitsubishi Electric Corp. < 
Libya NEC Corp. < 
Libya Northrop Grumman Corp. < 
Libya Raytheon < 
Libya Teledyne Technologies < 
Libya Textron < 
Libya TransDigm Group < 
Libya Vectrus < 
Libya ViaSat < 
Somalia AECOM < 
Somalia CAE < 
Somalia Dassault Aviation < 
Somalia Elbit Systems < 
Somalia Kawasaki Heavy Industries < 
Somalia Melrose Industries < 
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Somalia Mitsubishi Electric Corp. < 
Somalia Northrop Grumman Corp. < 
Somalia QinetiQ < 
Somalia Raytheon < 
Somalia Rheinmetall < 
Somalia Safran < 
Somalia SMITH WESSON BRANDS < 
Somalia Thales < 
South Sudan Aerojet Rocketdyne < 
South Sudan BAE Systems < 
South Sudan BWX Technologies < 
South Sudan CACI International < 
South Sudan Dassault Aviation < 
South Sudan Elbit Systems < 
South Sudan Fincantieri < 
South Sudan General Dynamics Corp. < 
South Sudan L3 Technologies < 
South Sudan Leidos < 
South Sudan Lockheed Martin Corp. < 
South Sudan Melrose Industries < 
South Sudan Mitsubishi Electric Corp. < 
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South Sudan Saab < 
South Sudan SMITH WESSON BRANDS < 
South Sudan ST Engineering < 
South Sudan Thales < 
South Sudan WOOSU AMS CO LTD < 




Sudan Booz Allen Hamilton < 
Sudan Saab < 
Sudan Teledyne Technologies < 
Syria Ball Corp. < 
Syria Bharat Electronics < 
Syria Booz Allen Hamilton < 
Syria BWX Technologies < 
Syria Dassault Aviation < 
Syria Fujitsu < 
Syria 
KRATOS DEFENSE AND 
SECURITY SOLUTIONS < 
Syria Leonardo < 
Syria Mitsubishi Electric Corp. < 
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Syria NEC Corp. < 
Syria Northrop Grumman Corp. < 
Syria Oshkosh Corp. < 
Syria QinetiQ < 
Syria Saab < 
Syria 
Science Applications 
International Corp. < 




Syria ThyssenKrupp < 
Syria TransDigm Group < 
Yemen Amphenol Corp. < 
Yemen Babcock International Group < 
Yemen Fincantieri < 
Yemen Rafael < 
Yemen Serco Group < 
  
 
